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Abstract Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there
are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what
follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The
question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one
can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer
to it. In particular, I advance two logical norms of agnosticism, where the first one allows us
to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about the conclusion of a valid argument,
and the second one allows us to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about one of
the premises of a valid argument.
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1 Logic and the norms of belief
Even if Harman (1984, 1986) was right to say that logic plays no special role in the normativity
of reasoning, it is far from clear that it is not relevant at all to the normativity of reasoning.1
There is something epistemically wrong with someone who believes that Jane loves Alex and
at the same time believes that Jane loves no one; and that is so even if there are situations—
e.g. preface paradox-like situations—in which one seems to harbor inconsistent beliefs in a
rational manner.2 Furthermore, rational subjects are at the very least committed to the logical
consequences of their views, even though it would be a waste of their cognitive resources to
clutter their minds with the infinitely many trivial consequences of their beliefs (see Harman
1986, p. 12).
Harman not only points out that sometimes it is reasonable for us to hold inconsistent views
and that we should not clutter our minds with trivial logical consequences; he also points out
that logic-based norms of reasoning—e.g. the one saying that one’s beliefs should be closed under
logical consequence—are overly demanding for cognitively limited reasoners like us (1986, pp.
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1 In this paper I am concerned with the normative import of logic/logical entailment to the normativity of
doxastic attitude-management, where the relevant type of normativity is epistemic normativity. For a different
perspective on the normativity of logic—one according to which it comprises norms for multi-agent dialogical
interactions—see Dutilh Novaes (2015).
2 See Makinson (1965) for the original formulation of the preface paradox, and Steinberger (2017, §4.2) for
discussion concerning the importance of that paradox to the normativity of logic. The relevant pattern here is
as follows: one rationally believes each of φ1, ..., φn individually but at the same time believes that it is not the
case that (φ1 and...and φn).
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12-14). Taken together, these points would indeed seem to undermine the claim that there is a
special (tight, universal, exceptionless) connection between logic and the norms of reasoning.
Philosophers have responded to Harman’s challenge in different ways. Their views can be
concisely expressed through so-called ‘bridge principles’: principles that establish a positive
connection between logical entailment and doxastic norms.3 The following bridge principles
were advanced by MacFarlane (M1, M2), Streumer (S) and Field (F) respectively:4
(M1) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then one ought to see to it that if one believes all of φ1, ..., φn one does
not disbelieve that ψ.
(M2) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then there is a reason for one to see to it that if one believes all of
φ1, ..., φn one believes that ψ.
(S).3 If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then there is a reason against one’s both believing all of φ1, ..., φn and
believing that not-ψ.
(F).1 If φ1, ..., φn obviously entail ψ then one’s degrees of belief in φ1, ..., φn, ψ should be related
as follows: Cr(ψ) ≥ Cr(φ1) + · · ·+ Cr(φn)− (n− 1).
Neither of (M1), (M2) and (S) require reasoners to actively form beliefs in the logical conse-
quences of their beliefs. Suppose that φ |= ψ; then (M1) says that one ought to be such that one
does not believe that φ and disbelieve that ψ at the same time; and (M2) only says that there
is a reason for one to be such that one believes that ψ if one believes that φ or, equivalently,
to be such that either one does not believe that φ or one believes that ψ (if we interpret that
conditional as a material conditional, as MacFarlane does and as I will do it here); (S) only
says that there is a reason for one not to believe that φ and believe that not-ψ at the same
time. The reasons concerned in (M2) and (S) are to be understood as prima facie, pro tanto
reasons (see Broome 2000, pp. 79-81).
So one can rationally believe that φ without yet believing that ψ and still be in conformity
with all of these norms. In this way MacFarlane and Streumer avoid Harman’s clutter avoidance
objection, which says that a bridge principle better not require us to clutter our minds with
all the logical consequences of our beliefs. It is not clear that Field’s principle (F) fares well in
that regard, however. To be sure, the entailment relation is here required to be obvious to the
reasoner—but that does not really address the problem of clutter avoidance, since there are
many entailment relations that are obvious to us whose conclusions would equally clutter our
minds.5
3 Sometimes it is not the sheer relation of logical entailment that figures in these bridge-principles—but rather
the subject’s grasp of that relation. E.g. Harman (1986, pp. 18-19) formulates principles in which one needs to
recognize that a certain proposition is implied by (the contents of) one’s beliefs. MacFarlane (2004, pp. 22-23)
on the other hand talks about a subject apprehending a pair of premises and conclusion as an instance of
an inference schema. Notice, however, that MacFarlane eschews bridge principles that only allow us to derive
normative claims from the fact that one knows that φ1, ..., φn entail ψ (as opposed to just the fact that φ1, ..., φn
entail ψ)—not on account of the fact that they are false principles, but rather because they are not general
enough: they fail to constrain the attitudes of those who have no knowledge of logical truths. And so MacFarlane
writes: ‘The more ignorant we are of what follows logically from what, the freer we are to believe whatever we
please’ (MacFarlane 2004, p. 12). For more on the drawbacks of ‘attitudinally constrained’ bridge principles, see
Steinberger (2017, 4).
4 For the sake of notational uniformity, I am rewording these author’s bridge principles (e.g. they use different
propositional variables). For the original versions, see MacFarlane (2004, pp. 7-8), Streumer (2007, p. 362) and
Field (2009, p. 255) respectively. Notice that these are all wide-scope bridge principles, i.e. their deontic operators
take wide-scope in the consequent. For the advantages of wide-scope over narrow-scope bridge principles, see
again MacFarlane (2004) and also Steinberger (2017).
5 To address this worry, Field (2009, p. 255) suggests restricting (F) to agents who already have degrees of
belief in all of φ1, ..., φn and ψ. But then (F) would not be general enough. Field’s principle is already a restricted
one, since it does not apply to those cases in which the entailment relation is not obvious to one. With this
further restriction, the rule is now also silent about those who lack the relevant degrees of belief.
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When it comes to Harman’s objection of apparently rational inconsistent beliefs, (M1) would
appear to be in trouble. There are preface-like situations in which one believes all of φ1, ..., φn
(make n as large as you wish) and at the same time disbelieves the conjunction of all of those
propositions (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) in an apparently rational manner.6 Both (M2) and (S) avoid this
problem since, again, reasons are prima facie and pro tanto. And so it may turn out that the
reasons one has to avoid inconsistencies are counterbalanced by one’s reasons to believe that
one’s judgments are not always accurate, in such a way that one does not have all-things-
considered reasons to avoid the inconsistency. Field’s (F) (or one of its amended versions)
avoids the problem in a different way: one is permitted to have a high degree of belief in each of
φ1, ..., φn individually and yet not a high degree of belief in their conjunction (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn).7
With respect to Harman’s objection of excessive demands, Field’s (F) softens it again by
including a cognitive constraint in that principle’s antecedent. If an entailment relation is not
obvious to one, one’s degrees of belief are not required to be as described in (F). (M1) also
does not impose excessive demands, but for a different reason: it only forbids the subject to
disbelieve the consequences of her beliefs, as opposed to requiring the subject to actively believe
them. (M2) and (S) do not impose excessive demands either, for they just say that there is a
reason for one to be/not to be a certain way, not that one ought to be/not to be that way.
And so it seems that, in the face of Harman’s objections, (M2) and (S) are the bridge
principles that are better off among the ones I have listed above. A defender of (F) would
still have to address the problem of clutter avoidance, whereas a defender of (M1) would still
have to address the problem of apparently rational inconsistent beliefs. The bottom line of this
discussion for my present purposes is that, if either of those bridge principles is true ((M2) and
(S) being the ones that have a better chance here), then logical entailment puts a normative
constraint on our beliefs. I won’t take issue with whether MacFarlane’s, Streumer’s or Field’s
proposals establish (contra Harman) that there is indeed a special connection between logic and
the normativity of reasoning. Suffice it to say that there is a connection, and that principles
like (M2) and (S) are good candidates for establishing that connection.
Both Harman and his critics have concentrated on bridge principles involving belief, disbelief
and degrees of belief.8 But perhaps we should not expect logic to be relevant only to the rational
management of assertive and negative types of doxastic attitudes. Perhaps logic is also relevant
to the rational management of agnostic attitudes, or attitudes of suspending judgment. That
is the idea I am going to explore now.
6 What is it to disbelieve a proposition? In one natural interpretation, it is just to believe the negation of
that proposition. MacFarlane (2004, p. 8) decides not to adopt that interpretation, however. One of his reasons
for not doing so is that one already has to make a decision about the correct logic/semantics for negation if
one is to opt for that interpretation, and he wants to avoid that. E.g. by ‘disbelieving that φ is just believing
that not-φ’ one could mean: (a) that disbelieving that φ/believing that not-φ is like believing that φ is false,
in which case negation behaves classically, or (b) that disbelieving that φ/believing that not-φ is like believing
that φ is not true, in which case negation need not be classical—one might believe that φ is not true without
believing that φ is false, because e.g. φ has a ‘gappy’ value (it is undetermined); etc. His other reason for not
adopting that interpretation and being more neutral about the nature of disbelief is that some dialetheists reject
the equivalence between ‘S disbelieves that φ’ and ‘S believes that not-φ’: for some φ, one is allowed to believe
both that φ and that not-φ, even though one is not allowed to both believe and disbelieve that φ—see Priest
(1998, p. 425). I will not take a stand on these issues here, as what I propose below does not really hang on it.
7 E.g. suppose that you have a degree of belief of 0.9 in each of p1, p2, ..., p5 (five different propositions); so
Cr(p1) + · · ·+Cr(p5)− (5− 1) = 4.5− 4 = 0.5; so your degree of belief in (p1 ∧ · · · ∧ p5) is only required to be
bigger than or equal to 0.5. Even if it is equal to 0.5, your degrees of belief are as they should be according to
(F). That number gets smaller and smaller as we add more conjuncts.
8 I will briefly discuss the interpretation according to which agnostic attitudes are degrees of belief in a
moment.
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2 Suspension of judgment
In what follows, I will flesh out bridge principles involving ascriptions of agnostic attitudes (or
‘bridge principles of agnosticism’ for short). But before I do that, let me make a few important
observations about the very notion of suspended judgment.
First, suspended judgment is supposed to be an attitude that one takes toward a proposition,
not merely a lack of belief and disbelief toward that proposition. If we let ‘Sxφ’ stand for ‘x
suspends judgment about φ’, ‘Bxφ’ for ‘x believes that φ’ and ‘Dxφ’ for ‘x disbelieves that φ’,
then that means that the following is false:
(E) Necessarily, for all x, φ: Sxφ ≡ (¬Bxφ ∧ ¬Dxφ),9
where ‘≡’ is a symbol for (material) equivalence and ‘¬’ for (classical) negation. In the way
I am using these verbs here—i.e. ‘believes’, ‘disbelieves’ and ‘suspends judgment’—all of Sxφ,
Bxφ and Dxφ imply that x has taken an attitude toward φ (even if only implicitly so), or that x
has an opinion about whether φ is the case. And since (¬Bxφ∧¬Dxφ) may be true even when
x has not yet taken any attitude whatsoever toward φ, it does not imply that Sxφ. To give an
example by Jane Friedman (2013a, p. 168), when I came to the world I did not believe that The
bumblebees hibernate during the winter, and I did not disbelieve that proposition either; but
that hardly makes it the case that I used to suspend judgment about whether The bumblebees
hibernate during the winter when I was a newborn.10
It is not my goal to fully analyze or explicate the notion of suspending judgment here, or
to say what it is more precisely to take that attitude toward a proposition. It is good enough
for my present purposes (i.e. that of fleshing out bridge principles of agnosticism) to assume
that suspending judgment consists in taking a neutral stance or opinion regarding the truth of
a proposition—but a stance regarding the truth of that proposition nonetheless.
Second, this much of logical behaviour is implied by the very nature of suspension: to
suspend judgment about φ is to be agnostic about both φ and ¬φ. This is more effectively
captured by the idiom ‘suspends judgment about whether φ’, which can be abbreviated by the
idiom ‘suspends judgment about φ’ (see again Friedman 2013a, Fn. 4). And so whichever bridge
principles we get that involve ascriptions of the form Sxφ will automatically give us principles
that involve ascriptions of the form Sx¬φ. Thus, I will rely on the following equivalence (which
as we will see will be very useful below):
(EQ) Necessarily, for all x, φ: Sxφ ≡ Sx¬φ.11
9 Something similar to (E) was endorsed by Chisholm (1976, p. 27)—but he uses the verb ‘to withhold’ instead
of the verb ‘to suspend’, and so I am not quite sure that he wants to capture the same type of doxastic state as
I and others do when we use the latter verb.
10 The view according to which suspending judgment is an attitude (on a par with believing and disbelieving)
is argued for by Friedman (2013a). She finds problems with different attempts to capture suspended judgment
through lack of belief and disbelief (sometimes with additional clauses that do not yet amount to the requirement
of an agnostic attitude in its own right), and concludes that taking a neutral/undecided stance toward φ is needed
for suspending judgment about φ. The latter account of suspended judgment avoids the problems with (E) and
its variants. I won’t rehearse Friedman’s arguments here, and so I direct the interested reader to her paper
(2013a).
11 One might worry about the fact that (EQ) plus Sxφ entail that Sx¬¬φ, Sx¬¬¬φ, Sx¬¬¬¬φ and so on,
because it looks as if e.g. I don’t need to suspend judgment about It is not the case that it is not the case
that it is not the case that it is not the case that the Democrats will win when I suspend judgment about The
Democrats will win. Huge concatenations of negations like that would seem to be intractable for cognitively
limited reasoners like us. But φ/¬φ in (EQ) are supposed to stand for more or less coarse-grained propositions,
and I am assuming that one does not need to token the sentence ‘It is not the case that it is not the case that
it is not the case that it is not the case that the Democrats will win’ in order to suspend judgment about the
proposition that It is not the case that it is not the case that it is not the case that it is not the case that
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Third, whether or not it is possible for one to suspend judgment about φ and believe that
φ at the same time, I will at the very least assume that one has reasons not to do so; and the
same applies to suspending judgment about φ and disbelieving that φ/believing that ¬φ at the
same time (see Ha´jek 1998, p. 203 for a similar point).12 Let ‘R’ stand for ‘there is a reason
for one to be such that ’. We can therefore avail ourselves of the following ‘minimal’ principles
of agnosticism below:
(R1) R¬(Bφ ∧ Sφ),
(R2) R¬(Dφ ∧ Sφ).
(Here I am using ‘R¬(Bφ ∧ Sφ)’ as an abbreviation of the universally quantified ‘For all x, φ:
R¬(Bφ ∧ Sφ)’, and similarly for the other cases. This convention is adopted throughout the
paper).
Fourth, in what follows I will talk about suspension of judgment understood as a categorical
attitude, as opposed to a middling degree of belief or credence. If agnostic attitudes were
identical or reducible to credences, Field’s principle (F) would already establish (if true) a
connection between logical entailment and norms for suspension of judgment. The question
would be, then: which subinterval [r, s] ⊆ [0, 1] is such that a subject suspends judgment about
φ if and only if her degree of belief in φ falls in that subinterval? But the problem is that the
view according to which suspending judgment is a matter of having credences in this way has
already been shown to be deeply problematic. Friedman (2013b) presents examples in which one
is entitled to suspend judgment about a series of contingent propositions p1, ..., pn (on account
of lack of evidence for or against each of these propositions) but one is at the same time entitled
to suspend judgment about both the conjunction (p1∧· · ·∧pn) and the disjunction (p1∨· · ·∨pn)
of those propositions.13 If one were to have middling credences toward each of p1, ..., pn (i.e.
credences that lie in the relevant subinterval [r, s]), however, one would not be entitled to have
middling credences in (p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn) and (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) respectively.14
Of course, there might be alternative ways of analyzing suspension of judgment in terms of
credences or degrees of belief (though some of these alternatives have already been criticized
the Democrats will win, which is the same as the proposition that The democrats will win. This is compatible
with saying that, in order to count as suspending judgment about that proposition, one must have considered
it under the guise of one sentence or other (not a particular sentence—any sentence that expresses the relevant
proposition), or that one would use one sentence or other to express one’s attitude toward that proposition.
And so in general one may suspend judgment about ¬¬¬¬φ under the guise of the sentence ‘φ’, without even
considering the sentence ‘¬¬¬¬φ’ (or one would use the former sentence but not necessarily the latter to express
one’s agnosticism about that proposition).
12 I am not hereby making any concession to the defender of the view that one can believe/disbelieve that φ
and suspend judgment about φ at the same time. As two anonymous reviewers have pointed out to me, this
view is highly implausible. It is just that I can rely on a weaker claim to get where I want here.
13 This result won’t always obtain when the pi are contingent. E.g. suppose that I rationally suspend judgment
about whether card c is a Jack and also about whether c is a Queen (its face is turned down). In this case
I am not entitled to suspend judgment about whether c is a Jack and c is a Queen, since I know that the
two conjuncts are incompatible with each other. Similarly, I would not be entitled to suspend judgment about
whether c is either a Jack or a Queen if the dealer (whom I take to be honest and reliable) had told me that c
is one of these two. Friedman’s examples, however, are such that one does not have reasons to believe that the
pi are incompatible with each other, and one does not have reasons to believe that at least one of them must
be true either.
14 Or at least not if we assume that those credences are standard, or that they uniquely represent a subject’s
total doxastic standing and are normatively bounded by the axioms of the standard probability calculus—see
Friedman (2013b, pp. 57-58). When credences are standard in the envisioned scenarios, one’s rational credence
in (p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn) would go below r (unless we stipulate r = 0) and one’s rational credence in (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn)
would go above s (unless we stipulate s = 1). Would those problems remain if we were to interpret agnostic
attitudes as non-standard credences? Perhaps, but it is on the proponent of the reduction thesis to come up
with a theory of non-standard credences that avoids those objections—I will not try to do that here.
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earlier in the literature),15 but it is safer for me now to assume that suspending judgment is
not a matter of having middling credences.
3 Logical principles of agnosticism modeled after (M1) and (S)
It might be expected that the following would do as a bridge principle of agnosticism:
(A1) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then one ought to see to it that if one believes all of φ1, ..., φn one does
not suspend judgment about ψ.
Or equivalently: If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then one ought to see to it that if one suspends judgment about
ψ one does not believe all of φ1, ..., φn. In this case, suspended judgment about a proposition
constrains one’s other doxastic attitudes not by virtue of what that proposition entails—but
by virtue of what entails it. We should not believe propositions that entail the propositions we
are agnostic about.
E.g., those who are agnostic about the existence of God better not believe things that entail
that God exists; and they better not believe things that entail that God does not exist either,
since suspension of judgment about the former is also suspension of judgment about the latter
(EQ). Another example: suppose I am a skeptic about the existence of the external world, in the
sense that I suspend judgment about whether There are mind-independent objects out there; at
the same time, however, I act as if there are external objects in my surrounding environment:
I try to avoid crashing into the tree when riding my bike, I go back to pick up my keys where
I left them, etc. To the extent that these actions of mine manifest my beliefs that there are
mind-independent trees, keys, etc. I am failing to abide to (A1). I am not as I ought to be: I
should either give up on my beliefs that there are mind-independent trees, keys, etc. or cease
to be a skeptical about the existence of a mind-independent world.
Familiar objections soon present themselves against (A1), however. If ψ is a logical conse-
quence of one’s beliefs then, according to (A1), one’s doxastic state is in order only if one does
not suspend judgment about ψ. But if ψ is a very complex logical consequence of one’s beliefs,
and one would not be able to deduce it on the basis of one’s beliefs, then it hardly seems wrong
for one to suspend judgment about ψ. This is again the problem of excessive demands. Notice
furthermore that this is a problem for (A1) despite the fact that it is not a problem for (M1).
We do find it problematic for one to disbelieve the complicated consequence ψ when one has
no idea whatsoever of whether ψ is true, or when one has no means of inferring that ψ from
the other things one believes; suspending judgment about ψ on the other hand seems to be
exactly the type of attitude that is called for in this situation. Of course, we could try and evade
this objection by restricting the normative claim to those cases in which the subject recognizes
the entailment relation, or those cases in which that relation is obvious to the subject. But we
would lose generality in this way: the norm would apply only to those subjects who are able
to grasp the relevant entailment relation, or to those subjects who find it obvious. Nothing is
said about the agnostic states of non-logically insightful subjects (the latter ones would have
15 See Monton’s (1998) and Ha´jek’s (1998) critiques of van Fraassen’s Bayesian approach (1989, p. 194), where
agnostic attitudes are represented instead by an interval [0, r] of probabilities. As pointed out by both Monton
(1998) and Ha´jek (1998), using 0 as a lower limit here would mean that one cannot change from an agnostic
attitude towards φ to a belief-attitude toward φ upon update on new evidence—and clearly this should be
allowed. According to Monton, any other choice of lower limit (bigger than 0 but still small) would still be
problematic for other reasons—see his (1998, pp. 208-209).
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more freedom in managing their doxastic lives—see MacFarlane 2004, p. 12 for the same point
concerning logical norms of belief).
Another source of trouble for (A1) are preface-like situations in which one believes each of
φ1, ..., φn and yet suspends judgment about (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) in an apparently rational manner.
To be sure, these situations are clearly possible. One way to see this is in terms of a series:
begin with the attitude that a rational subject has toward (φ1 ∧φ2) given her (strongly yet not
maximally) justified beliefs that φ1 and φ2 respectively (for simplicity, assume that all the φi
are atomic contingent propositions); not a sufficient amount of risk has been accumulated in
the transition from φ1 and φ2 to (φ1 ∧φ2), and our subject believes the latter accordingly. But
now consider the other end of the series: our subject is in the preface-like situation in which she
disbelieves (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧φm), or she believes that ¬(φ1 ∧ · · · ∧φm) (for a sufficiently large m) and
yet she rationally believes all of φ1, ..., φm. In-between these two extremes, for a certain n < m,
there will also be a situation in which the subject suspends judgment about (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧φn) and
believes all of φ1, ..., φn. To the extent that one can be normatively on the clear in this kind
situation, (A1) is in trouble again.
The following bridge principle avoids both objections:
(A2) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then there is a reason against one’s both believing all of φ1, ..., φn and
suspending judgment about ψ.
This principle is modelled after Streumer’s principle (S).16 Notice that ‘there is a reason against’
is to be read as ‘there is a reason for one not to be such that’. So the formal version of (A2) is:
(≡A2) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn ∧ Sψ).
Since (A2) does not require one not to suspend judgment about complex propositions that
follow from one’s beliefs (as (A1) does), it makes no excessive demands; it just says that there
is a prima facie, pro tanto reason for one not to do so. Furthermore, a reason for one not to
believe all of φ1, ..., φn and suspend judgment about (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) at the same time might
be counterbalanced by considerations concerning the likelihood that one has made at least one
mistake in making up one’s mind about the members of the series φ1, ..., φn. So (A2) also has
an advantage over (A1) in the face of preface-like situations.
(I take the reasons mentioned in (A2) and similar bridge principles to be true propositions.
They are the very truths about what follows from what (φ1, ..., φn |= ψ), perhaps in combination
with other epistemically relevant truths—e.g. true propositions about how close certain doxastic
attitudes are to the goals of getting at truths and avoiding falsehoods given that some other
attitudes have successfully promoted those goals.17 The subject does not need to be aware of
those truths in order for us to say that there are reasons for her to be a certain way. One might
16 To repeat: If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then there is a reason against one’s both believing all of φ1, ..., φn and believing
that ¬ψ.
17 This is just one example of possibly relevant truths. It might be suggested that another class of possibly
relevant truths here are those concerning accuracy dominance: facts about how certain combinations of doxastic
attitudes are dominated by other combinations of attitudes, in the sense that the latter ones always have
greater epistemic utility than the former ones (strict dominance), or always have at least as great utility as
the former ones and sometimes greater (weak dominance). Roughly put, epistemic utilities are measures of how
epistemically good those doxastic attitudes are given the truth-values of the propositions that constitute their
contents. See e.g. Easwaran and Fitelson (2015) for accuracy dominance arguments for epistemic norms. I myself
am not very happy with accuracy dominance arguments, on account of their weakness: they don’t allow us to
justify some of the very plausible wide scope bridge principles that I have been considering here. But I invite
the reader to check Richard Pettigrew’s manuscript ‘Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic’ (weblink in
the references below) to make his or her own mind. As Pettigrew shows (pp. 11-12), not even believing all the n-
premises and disbelieving the conclusion of a classically valid argument is guaranteed to be weakly dominated by
some other combination of doxastic attitudes toward those propositions—not unless we embrace what Pettigrew
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want to call those reasons ‘objective’ reasons. This is compatible, however, with requiring them
to be in some sense accessible to the subject, or to require them to be knowable to the subject
under certain ideal conditions.)
3.1 An argument for (A2)
Pointing out that (A2) avoids the objections that were raised against (A1) falls short of giving
an argument in support of (A2). So why should we think that, when φ logically entails ψ, there
is a reason against one’s both believing that φ and suspending judgment about ψ?
One line of argument in support of that claim makes use of (M2). Let ‘→’ be the material
conditional; then (M2) says that if φ |= ψ then R(Bφ→ Bψ). The argument runs as follows:
1. φ |= ψ (assumption for conditional proof)
2. If φ |= ψ then R(Bφ→ Bψ) (M2)
3. R(Bφ→ Bψ) (1, 2)
4. R(Bψ → ¬Sψ) (R1)
5. (Bφ→ Bψ), (Bψ → ¬Sψ) |= (Bφ→ ¬Sψ) (transitivity of →)18
6. R(Bφ→ Bψ), R(Bψ → ¬Sψ) |= R(Bφ→ ¬Sψ) (5, rule (C)—see below)
7. R(Bφ→ ¬Sψ) (3, 4, 6)
8. If φ |= ψ then R(Bφ→ ¬Sψ) (1-7 conditional proof, discharge 1)
The conclusion in line 8 is equivalent to: If φ |= ψ then R¬(Bφ∧Sψ), which is the single-premise
version of (≡A2) (the argument can easily be generalized to entailment with n-premises). A
formula equivalent to our principle (R1)—originally R¬(Bψ ∧ Sψ)—is used in line 4. The
principle is needed to derive R(Bφ→ ¬Sψ) in line 7.
Most importantly, the argument relies on the following ‘closure’ principle (line 6):
(C) From Φ1, ..., Φn |= Ψ derive R(Φ1), ..., R(Φn) |= R(Ψ),
where Φi, Ψ stand for formulas that involve only doxastic attitude-ascriptions and the truth-
functional operators (¬,∧,∨,→), e.g. formulas such as Bφ, ¬Sφ, (Bφ → (Bψ1 ∨ Bψ2)) and
¬(Bφ ∧ Sψ). Where Φ |= Ψ , the principle says something like: since it is impossible for one to
be such that Φ without also being such that Ψ , then the fact that there are reasons for one to
be such that Φ entails that there are reasons for one to be such that Ψ . Notice that one cannot
object to (C) in the manner that Dretske (2014) and others have argued against the thesis that
knowledge or justified belief is closed under logical entailment/competent deduction. Let p be
an empirical proposition and sh a skeptical hypothesis. Since Bp∧B(p→ ¬sh) does not entail
that B¬sh, (C) does not allow us to conclude that R(Bp∧B(p→ ¬sh)) |= R(B¬sh). It is after
all only entailment relations among logical combinations of doxastic attitude-ascriptions that
are concerned in (C). Φi and Ψ in (C) are restricted to those kinds of formulas. E.g. given that
calls ‘extreme conservatism’ in deciding what are the values of getting things right and getting things wrong
respectively. Let R be the value of getting things right: believing a true proposition has value R, and so does
disbelieving a false one; and let −W be the value of getting things wrong: believing a false proposition has value
−W , and so does disbelieving a true one. Extreme conservatism amounts to the claim that W > nR, where
n is the number of premises of a valid argument. Another option, and the one I find most natural, is to take
those values to be such that W = R; this is what Pettigrew calls ‘epistemic centrism’. The other options are
W < R and W > R—but none of these other options (except W > nR) delivers the result that, in general,
believing the n-premises and disbelieving the conclusion of a classically valid argument is dominated by some
other combination of doxastic attitudes toward those propositions.
18 In general: (Φ→ Ψ), (Ψ → Σ) |= (Φ→ Σ).
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¬(Bφ ∧ Sψ) |= (Bφ→ ¬Sψ), (C) allows us to conclude that R¬(Bφ ∧ Sψ) |= R(Bφ→ ¬Sψ);
but assuming that Bφ 6|= B(φ∨ψ), it does not allow us to conclude that R(Bφ) |= R(B(φ∨ψ))—
even though φ |= (φ ∨ ψ). (C) itself makes no use of entailment relations among the contents
of doxastic attitudes.19
Presumably, however, rule (C) fails: in some cases it can take us from truth to falsehood.
One can fetch counterexamples where, for some Φ1, Φ2 and Ψ with Φ1, Φ2 |= Ψ , the reasons
for one to be such that Φ1 and the reasons for one to be such that Φ2 are in conflict with each
other, and so there is no guarantee that there will be a reason for one to be such that Ψ .
The argument can be fixed to address that issue, however. We just need to add the require-
ment that the reasons for one to be such that (Bφ → Bψ) and the reasons for one to be such
that (Bψ → ¬Sψ) are not in conflict with each other (which is unlikely in this particular case
anyway). If that is the case, then nothing bars the conclusion that there is a reason for one to
be such that one does not believe that φ and suspends judgment about ψ, given that φ entails
ψ. One can think of it in this way: rule (C)—or a new version of it—is restricted to those cases
in which there is no conflict among the reasons for one to be such that Φ1 and the reasons for
one to be such that Φ2, ..., and the reasons for one to be such that Φn. So there is after all a
good argument that goes from (M2) and (R1) to (A2). (See this footnote
20 for the general case
involving n-premises).
3.2 A consequence of (A2)
The following bridge principle follows from (A2):
(A3) If φ |= ψ then R¬(Sφ ∧B¬ψ).
Notice that in the passage from (A2) to (A3) the attitude of suspending judgment has changed
its position from the entailed proposition to the entailing one. Here is a way of deriving (A3)
from (A2):
1. φ |= ψ (assumption)
2. ¬ψ |= ¬φ (1, contraposition of entailment)
3. If ¬ψ |= ¬φ then R¬(B¬ψ ∧ S¬φ) (A2)
4. R¬(B¬ψ ∧ S¬φ) (2, 3)
19 It might be thought however that rule (C) delivers ‘strange’ results. In being such that I believe that φ I am
also such that either I believe that φ or I do not believe that φ, i.e. Bφ |= (Bφ ∨ ¬Bφ); so if there is a reason
for me to be such that Bφ, is there also a reason for me to be such that (Bφ ∨ ¬Bφ)? ‘This looks strange’, one
might say. (For a similar problem involving the ‘ought’ operator in the context of deontic logic, see Ross 1941—I
thank an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to that similarity here). But strangeness aside, there is
indeed a reason for me to be such that (Bφ ∨ ¬Bφ) in this case. One can think of it in this way: suppose that
there is a reason for me to believe that φ and that I believe that φ accordingly; so far, I am doing the rational
thing, in the sense that there are reasons for me to be the way I am. But now notice that in being such that Bφ
I am also such that (Bφ ∨ ¬Bφ). And, if there is no reason for me to be such that (Bφ ∨ ¬Bφ), then I am less
than perfectly rational: there are no reasons for me to be the way I am. Since this is so for every case in which I
have reasons to be such that Φ (for any Φ, e.g. Bφ, (Bφ→ Bψ),¬(Bφ1 ∧Bφ2 ∧Sψ), etc.) and I am such that Φ
accordingly, that would result in massive irrationality. Every time I am such as I have reasons to be, I am also
such as I do not have reasons to be. I submit that this is false, and therefore it is way more problematic than
embracing (C) with all its ‘strangeness’ (in the trade-off between strangeness and falsehood, we should opt for
strangeness).
20 Notice, first, that a similar proof to the one from 1-8 above can be constructed, with If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then
R((Bφ1∧· · ·∧Bφn)→ Bψ) in line 2 and ((Bφ1∧· · ·∧Bφn)→ Bψ), (Bψ → ¬Sψ) |= ((Bφ1∧· · ·∧Bφn)→ ¬Sψ)
in line 5. Next we make a similar observation about the possibility of counterexamples to (C): we add that the
reasons for one to be such that ((Bφ1 ∧ · · ·∧Bφn)→ Bψ) and the reasons for one to be such that (Bψ → ¬Sψ)
are not in conflict with each other (which again is unlikely to be the case).
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5. R¬(S¬φ ∧B¬ψ) (equivalent to 4)
6. R¬(Sφ ∧B¬ψ) (equivalent to 5, given EQ: Sφ ≡ S¬φ)
7. If φ |= ψ then R¬(Sφ ∧B¬ψ) (1-6 conditional proof)
(A2) and (A3) together allow us to make normative claims about both types of situations:
those in which one is agnostic about the conclusion of a valid argument and those in which one
is agnostic about the premise of a (single-premise) valid argument. E.g., (A2) tells us that there
is a reason against one’s suspending judgment about whether God exists and at the same time
believing a proposition that entails that God exists. (A3) on the other hand tells us that there
is a reason against one’s suspending judgment about a proposition that entails that God exists
(e.g. that God has spoken to men) and at the same time believing that God does not exist.21
I.e. there is a reason for one to be such that if one suspends judgment about whether God has
spoken to men one does not believe that God does not exist (after all, if God does not exist
then it is not the case that God has spoken to men). As different as these two principles might
look, however, (A3) is already ‘contained in’ (A2), as the proof presented above shows us.
The proof, however, only gives us a single-premise principle. Since (A2) itself is not restricted
to single-premise entailment, there should also be a proper generalization of (A3) that can be
derived from (A2). There are two obvious candidate generalizations of (A3):
(A4) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then R¬(Sφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Sφn ∧B¬ψ),
(A5) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn−1 ∧ Sφn ∧B¬ψ).
It looks as if (A5) is the proper generalization—for we can use (A2) to give an argument in
support of (A5) that is analogous to the one given in support of (A3) above:
1’. φ1, ..., φn |= ψ (assumption)
2’. φ1, ..., φn−1,¬ψ |= ¬φ (1’)
3’. If φ1, ..., φn−1,¬ψ |= ¬φ then
R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn−1 ∧B¬ψ ∧ S¬φn) (A2)
4’. R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn−1 ∧B¬ψ ∧ S¬φn) (2’, 3’)
5’. R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn−1 ∧ S¬φn ∧B¬ψ) (equivalent to 4’)
6’. R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn−1 ∧ Sφn ∧B¬ψ) (equivalent to 5’, given EQ)22
7’. If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then
R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn−1 ∧ Sφn ∧B¬ψ) (1’-6’ conditional proof)
So we also get (A5) as a bridge principle of agnosticism, (A3) being just a special case of
it. What is to be made of (A4)? It simply does not seem right. Being agnostic about all the
premises and believing the negation of a conclusion of an entailment relation is not always by
itself problematic. I suspend judgment about whether Merkel is in Germany, and (therefore) I
suspend judgment about whether Merkel is not in Germany ;23 that Merkel is in Germany and
that Merkel is not in Germany together entail that Merkel is in Germany and Merkel is not in
Germany (in general, φ,¬φ |= (φ ∧ ¬φ)); but I believe that It is not the case that Merkel is in
Germany and not in Germany. If we let p stand for the proposition that Merkel is in Germany,
21 For the sake of this illustration, interpret God exists as being equivalent to ∃x(x = God).
22 To repeat: Sφ ≡ S¬φ (see Section 2).
23 Here the intended reading of ‘not’ is the de dicto reading, so that ‘Merkel is not in Germany’ is short for
‘It is not the case that Merkel is in Germany’.
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we can describe my doxastic state as follows: (Sp ∧ S¬p ∧ B¬(p ∧ ¬p)). I suspend judgment
about some contingent matter and I also believe a logical truth—what is wrong about that?24
Of course, if I have good evidence concerning the whereabouts of Merkel, perhaps I have a
reason not to be in that state. But that is simply because (in this case) I have a reason not
to suspend judgment about whether Merkel is in Germany. However, as in any other bridge
principles involving the R operator that we have considered so far, the reasons concerned in
(A4) are prima facie reasons for one to be a certain way (they are also objective reasons, as
we saw above). These are reasons that we take to ‘be there’ before we start considering more
specifically what other reasons are there for the subject to hold this or that doxastic attitude.
And so making reference to those possible additional reasons in the case at hand does not give
any support to (A4).
My doxastic state (Sp∧S¬p∧B¬(p∧¬p)) is not by itself problematic in view of the logical
facts—and that is because there isn’t any tension among the attitudes that constitute that
state given those facts. But a bridge principle that tells us that if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then R¬Φ
(where Φ is some logical combination of doxastic attitude-ascriptions toward φ1, ..., φn, ψ) is
true only when the attitudes that constitute Φ are in tension with each other in view of the
logical facts.
3.3 The tension test
But when or in which cases is there such a tension? One might rightly demand clarification
here, given the use that I make of this notion of ‘tension’ in rejecting principles like (A4) or
motivating principles like (A5) (more on this below). We can call the relevant kind of tension
‘logical incoherence’.25 I am not assuming that this is the only way of setting those doxastic
states whose attitudes are in tension with each other (in view of the logical facts) apart from
those whose attitudes are not, but here is one way of testing for that.
Let Φ be a doxastic state (X1φ1∧ · · · ∧Xnφn), where each Xi with i ∈ {1, ..., n} is either B,
S, ¬B or ¬S; so every Xiφi either ascribes a doxastic attitude toward φi or denies ascription
of a doxastic attitude toward φi.
26 Now we make the supposition that all conjuncts of Φ except
Xjφj have positive epistemic status and we check whether, in that case, the epistemic status of
Xjφj is somehow impaired (we repeat this process for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}). More specifically, we
check whether one has reasons not to be such that Xjφj under that supposition (if Xj denies an
ascription of attitude, i.e. Xjφj is ¬Y φj where Y is B or S, we say that one has reasons not to
be such that ¬Y φj iff one has reasons to be such that Y φj). So that means checking whether one
has reasons not to be such that Xnφn when each of X1φ1, ..., Xn−1φn−1 has positive positive
epistemic status, checking whether one has reasons not to be such that Xn−1φn−1 when each of
24 Notice that neither (A3) nor (A5) tell against my doxastic state in this case. The former does not tell against
it because it is a single premise bridge principle, and neither p |= (p ∧ ¬p) nor ¬p |= (p ∧ ¬p) are the case;
the latter does not tell against it because I suspend judgment about all the premises (p, ¬p) of the relevant
entailment relation (p,¬p |= (p ∧ ¬p)), as opposed to suspending about one of the premises and believing the
remaining premise (which in this case would already be problematic in itself).
25 It is an unfortunate feature of many accounts of coherence out there that they concentrate on assertive
attitudes only, thus leaving agnostic attitudes aside: those accounts do not tell us how well or bad agnostic
attitudes fit with a web of belief. This goes back to C. I. Lewis’s (1946) account of coherence as ‘congruence’:
a set of asserted facts is congruent only when every element of that set is probabilistically supported by the
remaining members of that set. Agnostic attitudes are also left out of the picture by BonJour (1985), Lehrer
(1990) and Thagard (2000).
26 For the sake of simplicity, I am leaving disbelief aside for now, understood as a sui generis attitude—for
my present purposes we can do with B¬φ instead of Dφ.
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X1φ1, ..., Xn−2φn−2, Xnφn has positive epistemic status, etc. If in each of these cases one has
reasons not to be such that Xjφj given that all the other conjuncts of Φ are in good epistemic
standing, and that is so in virtue of the fact that φ1, ..., φn |= ψ, then we can say that there
is the relevant sort of tension among the attitudes in Φ, or that Φ is logically incoherent. (Of
course, if there is a single doxastic attitude in Φ that is by itself problematic—in that it already
is in bad epistemic shape in view of the logical facts—perhaps we cannot suppose that it has
the relevant type of positive epistemic status. But in that case we can already conclude that
the state Φ is logically incoherent: the state is by itself problematic because one of its doxastic
attitudes is by itself problematic). Call that test the ‘tension test’.
There are different options available as to what type of epistemic status we will ascribe to
the relevant conjuncts of Φ in each stage of the test. Notice, however, that since not all Xi are
belief attitudes (they can also be agnostic attitudes) and since not all Xi are ascriptions of
doxastic attitudes (some of them deny an ascription of doxastic attitude), we cannot always
run the test by ascribing the same epistemic status (e.g. knowledge) to all conjuncts of Φ except
Xjφj and checking whether one has reasons not to be such that Xjφj under that supposition.
So we have to be sensitive to these features of a state Φ and choose the epistemic notions we
are going to use in the test adequately. To a first approximation, we can perform the test by
ascribing the best epistemic status we can to each Xiφi.
27
E.g. here is a way of submitting the doxastic state (Bp ∧B(p→ q) ∧ Sq) to this test:
(a) Suppose that one knows that p and one also knows that (p → q); given that much, there
are excellent reasons for one to believe that q—reasons not to suspend judgment about q.
(b) Now suppose that one knows that p and one justifiably suspends judgment about q (one’s
total evidence does not decide it one way or the other, and one is properly sensitive to that);
in that case, how could one justifiably maintain that (p→ q)? If one knows the antecedent
(p) but is justifiably agnostic about the consequent (q), then it should not be clear to one
whether the conditional is true either. If q is true the conditional is true—but if q is false
the conditional is false; and since as far as one knows q could be either true or false, also
(p → q) could be either true or false. So in this case one has reasons not to believe that
(p→ q).
(c) Finally, suppose that one knows that (p→ q) and one justifiably suspends judgment about
q; given that much, one has reasons not to believe that p. For the truth of (p → q) (which
one knows to be true) and the truth of p would guarantee the truth of q—i.e. they would
‘decide q for the truth’—but, as far as one knows, q could be either true or false.28
(E.g. consider: I know that If the number of stars is infinite then the universe is infinite but
I justifiably suspend judgment about whether The universe is infinite. Now the question is
raised to me as to whether The number of stars is infinite; since I am justifiably agnostic
27 If Xi is negative, e.g. Xiφi = ¬Bφi, we can say things like ‘the subject is warranted/justified in being such
that she does not believe that φ’ (for believing that φ would be unwarranted or unjustified for that subject).
28 A more detailed way of making the point would be, given that I justifiably suspend about q and I know
that (p→ q): (1) My evidence e does not give sufficient support to q (the probability of q conditional on e does
not get above the threshold for evidential support); (2) If e gives sufficient support to p (above the threshold),
it also gives sufficient support to q; (3) Therefore, my evidence e does not give sufficient support to p (1, 2);
(4) Therefore, there are reasons for me not to believe that p (i.e. the fact that my evidence does not give
sufficient support to p). If one is to interpret the support relation as confirmation, it is important not to take
‘sufficient support’ to mean incremental confirmation (Pr(p | e) > Pr(p)), but rather absolute confirmation
(Pr(p | e) ≥ t), e.g. with t = 0.8)—otherwise premise (2) would fail on account of the usual counterexamples to
the principle that if e (incrementally) confirms p then it also (incrementally) confirms the logical consequences
of p.
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about the infinity of the universe, I have reasons not settle the question thus: Yes, the
number of stars is infinite.)
So the test says that there is tension among the attitudes in (Bp ∧ B(p → q) ∧ Sq).29
Assuming that p, (p→ q) |= q, that doxastic state is ‘by itself problematic’ in view of the logical
facts. Now consider again the doxastic state (Sp ∧ S¬p ∧ B¬(p ∧ ¬p)). Suppose I justifiably
suspend judgment about p (Merkel is in Germany), and I justifiably suspend judgment about
¬p; do I thereby have any reasons not to believe that ¬(p∧¬p)? I do not: my not being able to
tell whether Merkel is Germany in no way gives me a reason to refrain from believing that It is
not the case that Merkel is and is not in Germany. So the doxastic state (Sp∧S¬p∧B¬(p∧¬p))
does not test positive for tension. For it is not the case that, whenever two among the attitudes
that compose that state have good epistemic status, the epistemic status of the remaining
attitude is impaired. That in turn gives us reasons to conclude that (A4) does not hold. There
are counterexamples to it, i.e. examples in which φ1, ..., φn |= ψ but it is not the case that
R¬(Sφ1∧· · ·∧Sφn∧B¬ψ). And that is because there are instances of (Sφ1∧· · ·∧Sφn∧B¬ψ)
with φ1, ..., φn |= ψ—our example being the doxastic state (Sp ∧ S¬p ∧ B¬(p ∧ ¬p))—whose
attitudes are not in tension with each other in view of the logical facts.30
4 Are there other bridge principles of agnosticism?
Let me briefly recap what I have done so far. First, I pointed out that (A1): if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ
then O¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bφn ∧ Sψ) falls prey to both the excessive demands objection and the
preface-like situation objection. These problems are avoided by (A2): if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then
R¬(Bφ1∧· · ·∧Bφn∧Sψ), since reasons are not strict in the way that obligations are (that there
are also reasons for one to be such that (Bφ1∧· · ·∧Bφn∧Sψ) is not a problem for (A2)). (A2) can
furthermore be derived from (M2): if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then R(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn → Bψ), and (R1):
R¬(Bφ∧Sφ). (A2) entails yet another bridge principle of agnosticism, i.e. (A5): if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ
then R¬(Bφ1∧· · ·∧Bφn−1∧Sφn∧B¬ψ). Together, (A2) and (A5) allow us to make normative
claims about both types of situations: those in which the subject suspends judgment about the
conclusion of an entailment relation and those in which the subject suspends judgment about
one of the premises of an entailment relation.
It is not quite correct to say that the good standing of (A2)/(A5) strictly depends on there
being a proof of these principles from (M2) (which I assume is in good standing). Taken by
themselves, (A2)/(A5) do deliver ‘intuitively correct’ assessments, or they do what we expect
such normative principles to do. There is again something wrong (at least prima facie) with
someone who believes that There was a Big Bang and that If there was a Big Bang then the
universe had a beginning but suspends judgment about whether The universe had a beginning.
29 Other bridge principles were used in each of these stages of the test but they are even less controversial
ones. In particular, in (a) I have assumed that if one knows that p and one knows that (p → q) then there are
reasons for one not to suspend judgment about q (one knows that p, knows that (p→ q), and that entails that
q is true). In (b) I have assumed that if one knows that p and one justifiably suspends judgment about q then
there are reasons for one not to believe that (p→ q). And in (c) I have assumed that if one knows that (p→ q)
and one justifiably suspends judgment about q then there are reasons for one not to believe that p. Reasons
are again prima facie and pro tanto reasons. These principles are not wide-scope but, if they are true, there
is no reason why we should not avail ourselves of these principles to put wide scope bridge principles to a test
and gain some insight into their correctness. Again, this test is just supposed to capture the tension among the
attitudes in the relevant doxastic state (Bp ∧B(p→ q) ∧ Sq), and there is no implication here that wide-scope
principles are reducible to narrow-scope principles, or that the latter ones are more fundamental.
30 When I write that Φ is/is not problematic in view of the logical facts, this is supposed to be compatible
with saying that Φ is not/is problematic in view of some other facts.
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Those attitudes are in tension with each other. Accordingly, (A2) tells us that that person has a
reason not to be in that doxastic state. In order to be responsive to that reason (in the absence
of better reasons to remain in that state), the person would need to revise her attitudes, e.g. by
also suspending judgment about the conditional while still maintaining her agnostic attitude
toward the proposition that The universe had a beginning ; or she could revise her views by
accepting that, after all, The universe did have a beginning while maintaining her previous
beliefs. Similarly, there is something wrong (at least prima facie) with someone who believes
that Andy is not a singer and at the same time suspends judgment about whether Andy is a
singer and a designer. Accordingly, (A5) tells us that that person has a reason not to be in
that doxastic state. In order to be responsive to that reason (in the absence of better reasons to
remain in that state), the person would need to revise her attitudes, e.g. by also believing that
It is not the case that Andy is a singer and a designer while maintaining her previous belief
that Andy is not a singer.
And so we already have two good candidates for logical principles of agnosticism. It might
be asked, however, whether this is the most we can do in this respect. In particular, one might
be wondering if there are also (true and universal) bridge principles in which agnostic attitudes
are ascribed to both the conclusion and at least one of the premises of a logically valid argument.
That is the idea I am going to briefly explore now.
4.1 Suspension on both sides of the entailment relation
One initial proposal is: if φ |= ψ then one has a reason to be such that if one suspends judgment
about ψ one also suspends judgment about φ. Or, in general (n-premises): if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ
then one has a reason to be such that if one suspends judgment about ψ and believes all of
φ1, .., φn−1, then one also suspends judgment about φn. But that principle is falsifiable. Let p
again be the proposition that Merkel is in Germany ; even though (p ∧ ¬p) |= p, suspending
judgment about p and believing that ¬(p∧¬p)—as opposed to also suspending judgment about
(p ∧ ¬p)—is not by itself problematic (as we already saw).31
Perhaps there is something to a principle that goes in the other direction, however. The idea
would be that, in general, if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then if one suspends judgment about all of φ1, ..., φn
one also suspends judgment about ψ. I suspend judgment about whether Merkel is in Germany
and I suspend judgment about whether Aneni is in Zimbabwe; I then consider the conjunction
Merkel is in Germany and Aneni is in Zimbabwe and I suspend judgment about that as well;
that looks like it is the right thing to do (assuming that I rationally maintain my previous
agnostic attitudes toward each of those conjuncts, and that I have no evidence to believe that
Merkel being in Germany and Aneni being in Zimbabwe are somehow incompatible states).
So the principle appears to have some traction. But it does not survive scrutiny either. Even
though p |= (p∨¬p), suspending judgment about p and believing that (p∨¬p) at the same time
is not by itself problematic. I suspend judgment about whether Merkel is in Germany—but I
do not suspend judgment about whether Merkel is either in Germany or not in Germany (I
rather believe that the latter is the case).32
31 In fact, assuming that |= ¬(p∧¬p), (A2) tells us that I have a reason not to suspend judgment about (p∧¬p).
For a special case of (A2) is that in which there is entailment with no premises (i.e. logical truth): if |= ψ then
R¬(Sψ). Assuming, then, that |= ¬(p ∧ ¬p), it follows that R¬S¬(p ∧ ¬p); but since S¬(p ∧ ¬p) ≡ S(p ∧ ¬p),
it follows that R¬S(p ∧ ¬p).
32 Similarly, if it is indeed the case that |= (p∨¬p), (A2) would also tell us that I have a reason not to suspend
judgment about (p ∨ ¬p).
Logical principles of agnosticism 15
Both of these principles can be tentatively fixed in a similar manner. In both cases we
have found counterexamples—i.e. situations in which there are no reasons for one to be such
as described in those principles—where logical truths are involved (either in the premises or
in the conclusion). The idea, then, is to include in the antecedent of our new principles the
requirement that the relevant propositions are not logical truths, like so:
(A6) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ, 6|= φn and 6|= ¬φn then R(Sψ ∧Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn−1 → Sφn),
(A7) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ, 6|= ψ and 6|= ¬ψ then R(Sφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Sφn → Sψ).
Again, however, (A6) doesn’t seem to work. I suspend judgment about whether Toby is an
animal (q), I believe that If Toby is a dog then Toby is an animal (p → q)—and yet I do not
suspend judgment about whether Toby is a dog (p); in fact I believe that Toby is not a dog. As
far as I know, Toby could be some other animal than a dog, or it could be something else, say,
a cartoon character. Notice that all the three conditions in (A6) are satisfied in this case, i.e.
(p → q), p |= q, 6|= p and 6|= ¬p. And my doxastic state (Sq ∧ B(p → q) ∧ ¬Sp) is not by itself
problematic in view of those logical facts—i.e. there is no tension among my attitudes in view
of those facts.33 So there is no reason for me to be such that ¬(Sq ∧B(p→ q) ∧ ¬Sp) in view
of those facts—we have a counterexample to (A6).
(A7) is also in trouble. I suspend about whether Aneni is in Zimbabwe (p), I also suspend
judgment about whether Aneni is in Germany (q), but I do not suspend judgment about
whether Aneni is in Zimbabwe and Aneni is in Germany (p∧ q)—I rather believe that It is not
the case that Aneni is in Zimbabwe and Aneni is in Germany. As far as I know Aneni could
be anywhere, including Zimbabwe or Germany, but I know that she could not be in both at
the same time. Notice that all the three conditions in (A7) are satisfied, i.e. p, q |= (p ∧ q),
6|= (p ∧ q) and 6|= ¬(p ∧ q). And yet there is no tension among the components of my doxastic
state (Sp∧Sq∧B¬(p∧q)) in view of those logical facts. So there is no reason for me to be such
that ¬(Sp ∧ Sq ∧B¬(p ∧ q)) in view of those facts—we also have a counterexample to (A7).
4.2 An attempt to improve upon (A6) and (A7)
In view of the previous counterexamples to (A6) and (A7), one might want to try and improve
upon those principles as follows:
(A8) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ, 6|= φn and 6|= ¬φn then R(Sψ ∧Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn−1 → ¬Bφn),
(A9) If φ1, ..., φn |= ψ, 6|= ψ and 6|= ¬ψ then R(Sφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Sφn → ¬Bψ).
The only (but important) difference between (A6) and (A8)—and also between (A7) and (A9)—
is in the consequent of the conditional that is under the scope of the R operator: suspending
judgment about φn versus simply not believing that φn. Since it takes more to suspend judgment
about φn than it takes to just fail to believe that φn (suspending judgment is just one possible
way of not believing), (A8) is weaker than (A6), and (A9) is weaker than (A8).
33 Running the tension test for (Sq ∧ B(p → q) ∧ ¬Sp): suppose I justifiably suspend judgment about q and
I know that (p → q); do I thereby have reasons not to be such that ¬Sp? That is: do I thereby have reasons
to suspend judgment about p as well? I do not—for believing that ¬p in that situation would also be perfectly
coherent. Notice the difference between that and one of the stages (i.e. (c)) by means of which I have established
that there is tension in the doxastic state (Sq ∧ B(p → q) ∧ Bp) above (§3.3): under the assumption that I
justifiably suspend judgment about q and I know that (p→ q), I do have reasons not to believe that p (for the
truth of p would decide q for the truth, and I am justifiably agnostic about q/my evidence does not decide q).
But having reasons not to believe that p does not guarantee having reasons to suspend judgment about p—one
may refrain from believing that p by disbelieving that p instead.
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Thus (A8) does not tell us that I have reasons not to be in the (non-problematic) state of
suspending judgment about whether Toby is an animal (q), believing that If Toby is a dog then
Toby is an animal (p → q) and also believing that Toby is not a dog (¬p); believing that ¬p
is one way of being such that ¬Bp. Rather, (A8) just tells us that I have reasons not to be in
the state (Sq ∧ B(p → q) ∧ Bp)—which is a state that is by itself problematic. Also, notice
that whereas (A6) says that I have reasons to be such that I suspend judgment about every
proposition that entails what I already suspend judgment about, (A8) only says that I have
reasons not to believe those propositions that entail what I suspend judgment about. And so if
there are also worries of excessive demandingness with respect to the (prima facie, pro tanto)
reasons operator, (A8) again fares better than (A6) in this regard.
34 But (A2) already tells us
all of that: (A8) is just a trivial consequence of (A2).
35 Even though (A8) is true, it does not
say anything terribly new when compared to (A2).
(A9) on the other hand is not really better off than (A7). There are states of type (Sφ1 ∧
· · ·∧Sφn∧Bψ) with φ1, ..., φn |= ψ, 6|= ψ and 6|= ¬ψ such that those attitudes are not in tension
with each other. E.g. suppose I suspend judgment about whether a is red (r), and also about
whether a is green (g)—I do not know what the color of object a is—even though I know that a
is either red or green (r∨g); all conditions in the antecedent of (A9) are satisfied: r, g |= (r∨g),
6|= (r ∨ g) and 6|= ¬(r ∨ g); and yet the doxastic attitudes of my state (Sr ∧ Sg ∧B(r ∨ g)) are
not in tension with each other in view of the logical facts. So there is no reason for me to be
such that ¬(Sr ∧ Sg ∧B(r ∨ g)) in view of those facts.
To sum up this section: the two bridge principles that we have considered with suspension
of judgment on both sides of the entailment relation, i.e. (A6) and (A7), are false; furthermore,
if we try to fix (A6) in the manner of (A8), we get a true principle, but one that is just a trivial
consequence of (A2), not much more informative than the latter; and if we try to fix (A7) in the
manner of (A9) we get yet another false bridge principle. So we have not succeeded in fleshing
out any other (true, universal) bridge principles of agnosticism that are more informative than
(A2)/(A5).
5 Concluding remarks and future directions
Are there bridge principles of agnosticism? I.e. is logic also relevant to the normativity of
agnostic attitude-management? I submit that (A2)/(A5) are on solid grounds and, therefore,
that the answer is ‘yes’. Where to go from here?
A natural next step is to try and use those principles of agnosticism to address issues
in philosophy of logic, along the lines of MacFarlane’s (2004) proposal (see also Steinberger
(2016)). In particular, if a given notion of entailment tells us that p1, ..., pn entail q (for certain
propositions p1, ..., pn, q) but it does not look as if there is any reason against one’s being such
that (Bp1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bpn ∧ Sq), or it does not look as if there is any reason against one’s being
such that (Bp1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bpn−1 ∧ Spn ∧ B¬q) (there is no tension among the attitudes in those
states), then perhaps we can use (A2)/(A5) to make a case against that notion of entailment.
36
34 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing that out to me.
35 Suppose that (A2): if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ then R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bφn ∧ Sψ); adding 6|= φn and 6|= ¬φn to the
antecedent of (A2) does not change anything, so we also have: if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ, 6|= φn and 6|= ¬φn then
R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bφn ∧ Sψ); but R¬(Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bφn ∧ Sψ) ≡ R¬(Sψ ∧ Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bφn) ≡ R¬(Sψ ∧ Bφ1 ∧
· · · ∧ Bφn−1 ∧ Bφn) ≡ R(Sψ ∧ Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bφn−1 → ¬Bφn); therefore, if φ1, ..., φn |= ψ, 6|= φn and 6|= ¬φn
then R(Sψ ∧Bφ1 ∧ · · · ∧Bφn−1 → ¬Bφn), i.e. (A8).
36 Of course, I have relied on certain logical principles in order to motivate (A2)/(A5)—but I cannot quite see
how one can completely avoid making use of some such principles here. In particular, I have used the logical
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Relatedly, one might wonder whether there are logical principles of agnosticism that are
stricter than (A2)/(A5), in the sense that they do not just tell us that there are reasons for
one to be such-and-such,37 but they also impose some sort of obligation to be such-and-such.
Stronger bridge principles are better suited for the task of motivating revisions in logic. We saw
above that (A1) was too demanding, and so it is still an open question whether there are (true,
universal) logical principles of agnosticism that are less strict than (A1) and yet stricter than
(A2). But obviously pursuing these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, which can be
seen as a prompt to that (deeper) investigation.38
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